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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN,
his wife, for themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 860148

vs
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Respondent,

ARGUMENT
Introduction.
Appellants Richard and Nancy Madsen's Reply Brief
includes 14 case opinions which were not cited in their opening
brief and which have not been addressed by Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association.

Most of those opinions are clearly

distinguishable without comment.

Six of them merit brief

discussion, however.

1.

Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point I."
The Madsens (their reply brief at 1-3, Point I) urge

the Court to ignore Judge Fishier1s findings and conclusion and
to re-examine the issue of disqualification anew.

Federal

courts, they contend, do so and they cite three cases in

support:

United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1982);

United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985); United
Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.
App. 3d 97, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1985).

Not one

of the cases supports the Madsens' argument.
In United States v. Nobel, the government charged the
defendants had devised a scheme to defraud Insurance Company of
North America.

The district court judge told defense counsel

that he and his family owned stock in INA (worth approximately
$10/000 to $15,000).
trial.

He mentioned it again on the eve of

Defense counsel did not object.

After guilty verdicts

were returned, one defendant appealed, contending the judge
should have recused himself either under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
because "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," or
under § 455(b) because he had "a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy."

In addressing the issue, the

court noted at the outset:
The accepted standard for reviewing disqualification
decisions is to determine whether there has been an
abuse of discretion.
Id. at 234.

The court's review was plenary only on the legal

interpretation of § 455(b):
However, whether a financial interest in a corporation
which was the victim of the crime at issue is a
"financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy" [within the meaning of § 455(b)] is a
matter of law as to which our review is plenary.
Id. at 234.

The Court did not hold its entire review was

plenary.
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United States v. Murphy is another criminal case.

The

defendant appealed his conviction, contending the close
personal relationship between the judge and the prosecutor
placed the judge's impartiality in question under § 455(a).
The Court held the inquiry into the appearance of partiality is
objective, without questions about actual bias.

The case says

nothing whatsoever about the standard for review on appeal.
United Farm Works v. Superior Court yields two
important guidelines, neither of which were mentioned by the
Madsens.

First, under the disqualification procedure employed

by Rule 63(b) (in which the challenged judge must allow another
judge to determine the issue of disqualification), the
appellate court is bound by the findings of fact made below.
Id. at 11.

Second, the economic aspects of the case (the costs

to retry the case and the overall inconvenience to the parties
and to the court) are given no weight:
While the waste of . . . trial weeks would be
unfortunate, the parties* right to a fair trial cannot
be compromised by such considerations.
Id. at 11, note 7.
2.

Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point II."
Prudential contends (its brief at 48-49, note 20)

disqualification relates back and renders all discretionary
judicial acts taken by the trial judge void.

The Madsens admit

(their reply brief at 3-5, Point II) disqualification is
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retroactive, but claim retroactivity applies only in cases of
actual bias and not when the trial judge merely gives the
appearance of partiality.

The cases cited by the Madsens

actually disprove their own argument.
The case most favorable to the Madsens is United
States v. Murphv, supra.

There, the court held

disqualification works prospectively for one reason:
Our research has not turned U P any case involving mere
appearance of impropriety in which the court set aside
[prior] decisions . . . .
Id. at 1539.

The court then footnoted its statement, noting

that a decision from the Fifth Circuit (Hall v. SBA, 695 F.2d
175 (5th Cir. 1983)) appeared to come close but the case was
best understood, said the court, as an example of actual bias,
not mere appearance,

id. at 1539, note 3.

The Madsens1 second

citation, Health Services Acquisition Corp v. Lilieberq, 796
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1986), resolves the matter.

In that case

the court held a party may move to vacate a prior judgment
solely on an appearance of partiality.

In support, the court

cited its prior decision of Hall, which it said was a case of
the appearance of partiality.

Id. at 802.

In the closing paragraph of Point II, the Madsens
contend the successor to Judge Rigtrup has the power to sign
and enter findings of fact.

The opinion of State v. Kelsey,

532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975) is cited as support.
application here.

The case has no

In Kelsey, the original judge tried the

defendant; he stated his verdict and judgment on the record; he
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prepared a final judgment, the sentence, and an order of
commitment; but then he resigned before written findings of
fact and conclusions of law were made.

His successor later

signed findings and conclusions, and this Court ruled he was
authorized by Rule 63(a) to sign them.

That is not this case.

None of the final paperwork had been prepared, signed, or
entered by Judge Rigtrup before Prudential moved for
disqualification.

Moreover, Judge Rigtrup is not disabled

within the meaning of Rule 63(a).

The telling distinction

between the cases, however, is this:

The findings and

conclusions were not required in Kelsey; they were surplusage.
Id. at 1005.

That is not true here. Making and entering

findings, conclusions, and a judgment are mandatory in a civil
case.
3.

See Rules 52(a) and 58(A), U.R.Civ.Pro.

Cases Cited in "Madsens' Point III."
The Madsens contend a judge need not be disqualified

if his financial interest in the outcome of the case is small.
They cite Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc.,
782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986) for support.
application to this case.

Its facts have no

There, the judge had presided over a

complicated plaintiff class action for two and one-half years.
Then, in February, 1983, the judge married.

Her new husband

maintained a personal retirement account which happened to
contain $100,000 worth of stock in IBM and Kodak.

In May, 1984

and again in May, 1985, the judge disclosed her husband's stock

-5-

interests in her annual financial disclosure statements
required by federal law.

In July, 1985, the defendant moved

the judge to recuse herself, pointing out that IBM and Kodak
were potential members of the alleged plaintiff class, although
then unnamed and a fact previously unknown to the judge.
fact, there was at the time no list of class members.

In

The

judge immediately ceased ruling on any motions in the case,
referring them to a magistrate or to another judge instead.
She instructed the parties to brief the issue whether § 455(b)
would be violated if her husband immediately sold the IBM and
Kodak stock in his retirement account.

In the meantime, she

also asked the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct of the
Judicial Conference of the United States for an advisory
opinion.

The Committee concluded that a sale of the stock

would remove her disqualification under Canon 3C(l)(c) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

The judge ultimately determined she

could resume control of the case if her husband sold the
stock.

He did so, incurring a brokerage fee of $900.

The

defendant contended on appeal the sale did not cure the
disqualification.
The Court of Appeals held the $900 brokerage fee was
too small to warrant a reasonable person's belief that the
judge was harboring any ill will towards the defendant.
based that conclusion on several factors:

It

her significant

salary; that her husband was a partner in one of the largest
law firms in Chicago; and that the $900 was less than 1% of the
proceeds of the sale.

The most important factor, however, was

that the fee would have been incurred anyway, whenever the

husband decided to sell the stock in his retirement account.
Thus, the $900 fee was inevitable.

Id. at 716.

Here, Judge

Rigtrup stands to gain money/ and his interest is the same as
every member of the plaintiff class.
4.

Cases cited in "Madsens' Point VII(D)."
Prudential noted (its brief at 42, note 24) the trend

in federal courts is to find disqualification cannot be
waived.

The Madsens (their reply brief at 15-16, Point VII

(D)) disagree, quoting United States v. Nobel, supra.

The

Madsens have not read Nobel carefully.
The disagreement between the parties is due to
semantics.

Prudential's argument is that the issue of

disqualification cannot be "waived" (i.e., relinquished, lost,
etc.) merely by not asserting it sooner rather than later.

The

authorities cited by Prudential illustrate the rule (its brief
at 42, note 24).

The Court in Nobel repeatedly uses the term

"waiver" when actually it means "remittal" of
disqualifiaction.

"Remittal" is the intentional abandonment of

a party's claim of disqualification after full disclosure by
the judge on the record of the potentially disqualifying
factors.

Section 455(e) provides for remittal of the

appearance of partiality under § 455(a).

That is why Nobel

focuses on the judge's repeated disclosure of his stock
interest in INA:
[I]t is sufficient under the statute if the judge
provides full disclosure of his or her relationship at
, a time early enough to form the basis of a timely
motion at or before trial and under circumstances
which avoid any subtle coercion. The election to
-7-

proceed after full disclosure of the relevant facts
satisfies those requisites and constitutes an
effective waiver [remittal] under the statute.
Id, at 237.

Footnote omitted.

The court then specifically

referred to Canon 3D of the Code of Judicial Conduct (titled
"Remittal of Disqualification") and noted that § 455(e), unlike
the Canon, does not describe a formal procedure for
accomplishing remittal.

The court concluded that the

advantages from following the Canon's detailed remittal
procedure are obvious.

Id. at 237.
CONCLUSION

The cases cited by the Madsens in their Reply Brief
are not persuasive.

The Order of Disqualification entered by

Judge Fishier should be affirmed.
DATED this 10th day of April, 1987.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
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*w Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association
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